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Summary  findings
Boadway, Roberts, and Shah propose four economic  Thus progressive redistributive taxes, stabilization
principles for use in deciding taxing responsibilities for  instruments, and resource rent taxes would be suitable
various levels of government. These are:  for assignment to national government; while tolls on
* Efficiency of the internal common  market. For  intermunicipal roads are suitably assigned to state
efficiency in internal common market, taxes on mobile  governments. Some resource taxes, such as royalties and
factors and tradable goods should either be assigned to  fees and severance taxes on production and/or output,
the national government or coordinated  among  are designed to cover costs of local service provision and
subnational governments.  could be assigned to subnational governments. In
* National equity. Progressive redistributive taxes  addition,  subnational governments  could also impose
ought to be assigned to the level of government having  taxes to discourage local environmental degradation. In
responsibility for redistribution,  usually the national  countries with a federal level VAT, it  may be too
government. Subnational governments could levy  cumbersome to have subnational sales taxes. In such
supplementary flat rates on the federal tax base.  circumstances, the fiscal need criterion would suggest
* Administrative costs. To minimize collection,  allowing subnational governments access  to taxes which
administration,  and compliance costs, a tax should be  are traditionally regarded as suitable for national
assigned to the level likely to be best informed about its  administration,  such as personal income taxes.
base. This suggests assigning real property taxation to  The authors also stress the importance of tax
local governments and corporate  income taxation to the  harmonization and coordination in preserving internal
national government.  common market, reducing collection and compliance
- Fiscal need. To ensure accountability, revenue means  costs and helping to achieve national equity objectives
should be matched as closely as possible to revenue  and suggest methods of achieving such coordination
needs. Thus tax instruments intended to further specific  vertically (between the federal and subnational
policy objectives should be assigned to the level of  governments) and horizontally (among subnational
government having the responsibility for such a service.  governments).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many  countries,  especially  in the industrialized  world, can be considered  to be fed-
erations  in a practical  sense that  significant fiscal functions  are undertaken  by lower
level jurisdictions,  both  on the  expenditure  and  on the  tax side.  Federal  economies
have developed  elaborate  forms of fiscal arrangements  between  the central  (federal)
and  lower (state  and  municipal)  levels of government  which jointly  determine  the
way in which tax bases are allocated  and  shared  among the various levels of govern-
ment  as well as the  transferring  of funds from  one level to  another.  The existence
of multiple  levels of taxing  authority  gives rise to  issues of tax  design not  found  in
unitary  states.
As the public  sectors  of developing  countries  evolve to provide more and  more
of the  sorts  of public  services found  in industrialized  countries,  the  benefits  of de-
centralized  decision making  are likely to become  more apparent.  The reform of tax
systems  required  to  streamline  the  raising of revenues will need to  take  account  of
the revenue  needs of lower levels of government.  This will naturally  put  constraints
on the  types  of tax  reforms  which are both  feasible  and desirable.  It is the  purpose
of this  paper  to  review  the  special  issues that  arise  in  reforming  taxes  in  federal
states.  The  conceptual  guidance  presented  here should,  however, be more generally
applicable  in a multi-jurisdictional  setting  regardless  of the  constitutional  structure
of the  country.
In  doing  so,  we draw  heavily  on  the  experiences  in  industrialized  countries
where federal  fiscal arrangements  have evolved over a long period of time.  Practices
in  these  countries,  though  highly  developed,  are  far  from  uniform.  They  differ
because  of  different  institutional,  political  and  geographical  circumstances  of the
country.  Nonetheless,  there  are  a  number  of economic principles  of taxation  in  a
federal  setting  that  have been  developed  in the  literature  and  that  can  be applied
to  any federal  economy.  Their implications  for any given country  will depend  upon
the features  of the economy, such as the extent  of decentralization  of functions,  the
degree of heterogeneity  of the population,  and  the extent  of government  intervention
in the  economy.  Our review will concentrate  on these  principles.
We begin with  a brief review of the economics of fiscal federalism  as it  relates
to  the  fiscal  arrangements,  that  is, to  the  combination  of the  system  of transfers
*  This  paper  was  prepared  for  the  project  on  Fiscal  Reform  and  Structural
Change sponsored  by the International  Development  Research  Centre,  Ottawa,
Canada.
1and  the  system  of tax  sharing  and  harmonization  in a federation.  Next,  we discuss
the  issue  of  tax  assignment:  which  taxes  ought  to  be  made  available  to  which
levels of government?  The  decentralization  of revenue raising  inevitably  gives rise
to  problems  of inefficiencies and  inequities  in  the  internal  economic  union.  Ways
of avoiding  these  through  tax  harmonization  and  coordination  are next  discussed.
Finally,  we outline  some of the implications  for tax  reform, especially in developing
countries.
II.  REVIEW  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  FISCAL  FEDERALISM
There  is  a  large  literature  on  fiscal  federalism.  Our  purpose  here  is  simply  to
summarize  the  basic lessons to be  derived from that  literature.'  Federal  structures
of government  allow for the  decentralization  of the  provision  of public  services  to
lower levels of government.  It is argued  that,  as in the private  sector,  decentralized
decision  making  generates  more  efficient  allocations  of resources.  It  does  so  by
enabling  governments  to  provide  a  mix  of services most  suited  to  the  needs  and
tastes  of local consumers,  by making governments  more accountable  to their citizens
by  devolving  decisions to  governments  which  are closer to  them,  and  by  instilling
greater  responsiveness  by competition  among governments.
A reasonable  working principle is to decentralize  all functions  except  those  for
which it can be demonstrated  that  central provision  is needed because  of economies
of scale,  because  the  benefits  of a  particular  type  of service  are  highly  public  in
nature,  or because  uniformity  of provision is an important  objective,  for example to
maintain  the  efficiency of the internal  economic union  or to  achieve national  equity
objectives.2 This principle leads to the following suggested  division of powers among
levels of government:
i.  Public  Goods  and  Services
Public  goods  and  services which  are national  in nature  should  be  assigned  to  the
federal  government.  These  include  such  things  as national  defense,  control  of the
money supply,  international  trade  and relations,  criminal law, national  environmen-
tal  issues.  Public  goods  whose benefits  mainly  accrue  regionally  or locally  should
be  assigned  to  lower levels of government.  Examples  include  roads  and  waterways,
water  supplies,  regional  environmental  issues,  land  and  resource  use,  garbage  and
recreation.  Goods  and  services  which  are  public  in the  economic  sense  make  up
only  a  small  proportion  of government  spending;  private-type  goods  and  services
Classic sources include Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972) and Breton and Scott (1978).
For more recent  general surveys, see Wildasin (1986) and  Boadway (1992).  The
principles applied to  developing countries may be found in Boadway, Roberts  and
Shah (1994).
2  This is an economic principle. There may well be important political constraints that
prevent the decentralization of economic power, such as the danger of destabilizing
the country. In this paper, our main concern will be with economic criteria.
2and  transfers  are much more important.
ii.  Quasi-Private  Goods and Services
Most  goods  and  services  expenditures  by government  are  on  quasi-private  goods
and services, which are private  services provided through  the public sector typically
free  of charge.  They  include  large  items  such  as education,  health  services,  and
welfare service.  In terms  of efficiency of provision,  they are most  suited  for delivery
by  lower levels of government,  since given expenditures  benefit  individuals  closest
to  where  the  expenditures  are  performed.  Nonetheless,  the  federal  government
may have an interest  in the way in which these types of services are being provided.
They typically  are instituted  for redistributive  purposes and  the federal  government
may have a legitimate  interest  in ensuring  that  national  equity  objectives  are being
satisfied.  As  well,  differential  provision  of quasi-private  goods  and  services  may
distort  the  allocation  of labor  across  states.  We return  below  to  the  means  by
which the federal  government  may exercise its responsibilities  for national  efficiency
and equity  while at  the same time  allowing these services to be decentralized  to the
states.
iii.  Transfers
Transfers  to  individuals  and  businesses also  comprise  a large  budget  item.  Trans-
fers to  individuals  serve  essentially  redistributive  purposes,  either  as a part  of the
income-based  tax-transfer  system,  or as part  of the  system  of social insurance,  in-
cluding  unemployment  insurance,  welfare  and  pensions.  To  the  extent  that  the
federal  government  has  responsibility  for redistributive  equity,  these  are necessary
policy  instruments.  States  may  nonetheless  have  some  interest  in  redistribution
based  on  local  preferences  and  may wish  to  supplement  federal  transfer  schemes
with  those  of their  own.  Transfers  to  business are  more clearly  a federal  responsi-
bility.  At the  state  level, they  are likely to  give rise to  distortions  in the  allocation
of capital  and  to  beggar-thy-neighbor  policies.
iv.  Regulation
As well as spending  money, governments  regulate  activities  of the  private  sector,
even though  economists  might  prefer that  they limit  themselves  in  this  area.  Reg-
ulation  of capital  markets  should  clearly be  a federal  responsibility  because  of the
mobility  of capital  and  the  possibility  of interfering  with  the  efficiency of the  in-
ternal  economic union.  Regulation  of goods which are freely traded  across internal
borders,  such  as  transportation,  communications  and  agriculture,  should  also  be
central.  Labor  market  regulation  is less clear-cut.  Some forms  should  be  clearly
federal,  such  as immigration  policies.  Others,  though  they  may fulfill local needs,
can clearly interfere with national  labor market  efficiency, such as professional licens-
ing.  On the  other  hand,  some forms of labor  market  regulation  such  as standards
in  the  work place  or labor  training  need to  be decentralized  to  conform with  local
customs  or to be  coordinated  with  education  or other  policies.
The  exact  application  of  these  principles  depends  upon  the  features  of the
particular  country.  The benefits  of decentralization  will be greater  the less homoge-
3neous  is the  population  across regions  and  the  more geographical  dispersion  there
is.  There  is obviously  a great  deal of judgment  involved in their  application.  One
important  factor  in determining  the limits  to decentralization  is the extent  to which
government  in general,  and  the federal  government  in particular,  is relied upon  for
redistributive  objectives.  In industrialized  countries,  much of what  governments  do
is redistributive  in nature.  Generally  speaking,  those  who place  greater  weight on
the  redistributive  role of government  tend  to  support  a larger  role for the  federal
government  in general,  and more responsibility  for redistribution  being assigned  to
the  federal  government.  Those  who would  prefer  less government  interference  in
the  economy,  and  less redistribution,  tend  to  favor  greater  decentralization  (since
competition  by lower levels of government  is thought  to  reduce the both  the size of
the  public  sector  and  its  ability  to  redistribute).
The decentralization  of expenditure  responsibilities  naturally  brings  with it the
need to  decentralize  revenue-raising  responsibilities.  Otherwise,  the lower levels of
government  would  be  dependent  upon  funding  from  the  central  government,  and
the full benefits  of decentralized  decision making  and political  accountability  would
not  be achieved.  It is the purpose  of the  following sections of this  paper  to  discuss
the  best  ways to decentralize  taxing  responsibilities.  However, the  extent  of decen-
tralization  of revenue-raising  need not  correspond  exactly with  that  of expenditure
responsibilities.  Indeed,  in virtually  all multi-government  economies,  lower levels of
government  finance some of their  expenditure  responsibilities  by transfers  from the
higher  level.  There  are  two reasons  for this.  The  first  is simply  that  the  case for
decentralizing  expenditure  responsibilities  is stronger  than  that  for  decentralizing
revenue  raising.  While  decentralizing  expenditures  leads to  more efficient  service
delivery,  it  is not  clear  that  there  are equivalent  efficiency advantages  (apart  from
fiscal accountability)  of decentralizing  revenue  raising.  On the  contrary,  decentral-
ization  of taxation  can lead  to significant inequities  and inefficiencies in the  federal
economy.  Thus,  there  are economic  advantages  from  having  more  taxes  collected
at  the  higher  level of government  than  is necessary  for its  own expenditures,  and
transferring  some of them  to the  states,  that  is, for there  being  a fiscal gap.
The  second  is that  the  transfer  of funds  from the  higher  to  the  lower level  of
government  can itself achieve important  objectives  in a federal  state.  In particular,
appropriately  designed  transfers  can  be  used  to  ameliorate  the  inefficiencies and
inequities  that  accompany  fiscal decentralization  while still  preserving  its benefits.
The  form  that  these inefficiencies and  inequities  take  has  a bearing  on the  form  of
the  transfers.  We can identify  four main objectives  for federal-state  grants:3
i.  Fiscal Efficiency
The  decentralization  of expenditure  and  tax  responsibilities  inevitably  leaves  dif-
ferent  jurisdictions  with  different  fiscal capacities  in  the  sense  that  they  can only
provide  given public  services  at very  different  tax  rates  to  their  citizens.  In other
words,  depending  on  the  state  of residence,  the  Net  Fiscal Benefits  (NFBs)  for  a
3  Though these are stated in terms of federal-state grants, similar arguments apply for
the case of state-municipal grants.
4given type  of citizen  will differ.  In -general, the  existence  of differential  NFBs  pro-
vides an incentive  for resources  (especially  labor)  to be allocated  inefficiently.4 The
quantitative  importance  of fiscal inefficiency depends  upon  the  degree  of mobility
of labor  across  states  as well as the  difference in  state  tax  capacities.  Fiscal ineffi-
ciency can be largely  alleviated  by a set of equalizing  transfers  to  states  to equalize
their  tax  capacities.  The  grants  should  be unconditional  and  unrelated  to  actual
tax  rates  or tax  effort within  a state.5
ii.  Fiscal Equity
NFB  differences also give rise to horizontal  inequities  in the federation,  as originally
pointed  out  by Buchanan  (1950). That  is, otherwise identical  persons will be treated
differently  by  the  public  sector  depending  on the  state  in which  they  reside.  The
same sort of equalizing unconditional  transfers  which can deal with fiscal inefficiency
are  also  appropriate  for  addressing  these  fiscal inequities.  This  is one  of the  rare
cases in economics  in which efficiency and  equity  concerns coincide.
iii.  Efficiency  of the Internal  Economic  Union
The exercise of fiscal responsibilities  by the states  is also likely to give rise to distor-
tions  in the free flow of goods, services, labor and  capital  across the states.  This can
occur  both  on the  tax  side and  on the expenditure  side.  In the  case of the former,
the  appropriate  action  is to  institute  some form  of tax  harmonization  among  the
states  or  between  the  states  and  the  federal  government;  we deal  with  that  in  a
later  section.  However, expenditure  policies can also interfere  with  the efficiency of
the internal  economic union.  Differences in program  design across states  can induce
labor  misallocation.  For example,  states  may impose residency  requirements  or re-
strict  portability.  As well, the  terms  of the  programs  may  be  designed  to  attract
desirable  residents  (e.g., skilled or wealthy  persons) and  to drive away less desirable
ones  (low-income  and  low skilled  persons).  The  federal  government  may  wish to
impose  guidelines  on states  to prevent  their  programs  from  distorting  the  internal
common  market.  One way to  do so is by the  use of conditional  grants  which  pro-
vide financial  incentives for provinces to design their programs  according  to criteria
set  out  by  the  federal  government.  This  is referred  to  as  the  use  of the  spending
power.  Ideally, the  criteria  should be  general  ones, no more restrictive  than  neces-
sary to  induce  provinces to cooperate.  In particular,  the provinces  should maintain
legislative  control  over programs  in their  areas  of responsibility  and  should  not  be
deterred  from  exercising  that  authority  in innovative  and  effective ways.  Generally
speaking,  the  conditional  grants  needed to foster  the internal  economic union need
not  be matching  ones.  They could be bloc grants  disbursed  according  to  simple ag-
gregate  formulas (e.g.  equal per  capita  or needs-based),  but  with  penalty  provisions
attached  for non-conformity  with  national  standards.
4  The exact circumstances in which this will be the case are discussed in Boadway and
Flatters  (1982); see also Wildasin (1986).
5  See Shah (1991, 1994) for a detailed discussion of the appropriate formulas.
5iv.  National  Equity  Objectives
Finally, the federal interest  in fostering national  standards  of redistributive  (vertical)
equity  may also lead to a role for the spending  power.  Much of actual  redistribution
takes place  on the expenditure  side of government  budgets  and is delivered through
quasi-private  goods.  To  the  extent  that  these  are the  responsibility  of the  states,
'the  only way for the  federal  government  to  achieve its national  equity  objectives  is
through  the  spending  power.  As with  item  iii., the federal  government  can provide
bloc grants  to the  states  with  conditions  attached  stipulating  general  standards  to
which  programs  should  conform.  These  could include  such things  as accessibility,
coverage of the program  and  portability.
The  system  of intergovernmental  transfers  makes up part  of the fiscal relations
between  different  levels of government  made  necessary  by  the  decentralization  of
responsibilities  to  the  states.  The  other  main  part  consists  of harmonization  and
sharing  arrangements  on the  tax  side.  These  are also  important  to  ensure  the  ef-
ficiency of the  internal  economic union,  to  foster  national  equity  objectives  and  to
maintain  the administrative  efficiency of the tax collection system,  while at the same
time  giving the  states  the  required  responsibility  for financing  their  own expendi-
tures,  at least  at  and  near the  margin.  The combination  of the system  of transfers
and  the  system  of tax  sharing  and  harmonization  comprise  what  is referred  to  as
the  fiscal arrangements  of the  federation.  It  is the  fiscal arrangements  taken  as  a
whole that  enable  the federation  to  achieve the fullest  benefits  of decentralized  fis-
cal responsibility  while at the same time preserving  the efficiency and  equity  of the
national  economy.  Decentralization  and  the  fiscal arrangements  go hand  in hand:
the more  decentralized  is the federation,  the more important  is the  system  of fiscal
arrangements;  and,  the more effective the fiscal arrangements,  the more confidence
one  can  have  in  advocating  the  decentralization  of decision  making.  Though  we
concentrate  on the  tax  side  of the  fiscal  arrangements  in  this  paper,  the  design
and  effect of various  tax harmonization  measures  is not  independent  of the  transfer
system.
Finally,  though  we  are  ultimately  concerned  with  tax  reform  in  developing
countries,  much of the  experience  we draw  on  is in  industrialized  economies  with
longer  histories  of federal  decision making.  There  are some  very fundamental  dif-
ferences  in the  roles  assumed  by governments  in the  two sorts  of economies  which
will set  limits  on  how far  tax  reforms  in a  federal  system  can be  taken.  By  and
large,  governments  in industrialized  countries  have more advanced  social programs
and  redistributive  schemes,  have  tax  mixes  which  rely more  on  direct  taxes  and
general  taxes,  and  are more decentralized  than  those  in developing  countries.  This
will have an  influence on how far the  principles  of this  paper  are to  be  applied.
III.  TAX  ASSIGNMENT
Governments  rely on a wide variety  of tax  instruments  for their  revenue  needs,  in-
cluding  direct  and  indirect  taxes,  general and  specific taxes,  business and individual
taxes,  etc.  The  question  we address  here is which types  of taxes  are most  suitable
:;  ~~~~~~~~~6for use by lower levels of government.  We begin with  a  statement  of general  prin-
ciples and  then  consider  how these  principles  might  apply  to  each of the  common
types  of taxes  typically  levied.
1.  Principles  of  Tax  Assignment
The  assignment  of taxes  by jurisdiction  depends  partly  on the mix of various  taxes
used  in  the  country  overall.  In  public  finance  theory,  the  issue  of the  ideal  tax
mix  even in  a unitary  state  has  not  been  widely developed.  Governments  almost
universally  employ balanced  tax systems  which have the feature  that  different taxes
apply  to  basically  the  same bases.  For example,  general  sales taxes,  payroll  taxes
and income  taxes  have bases which overlap considerably.  From the point  of view of
standard  efficiency and  equity, one should  be able to  make do with  a single general
tax  base,  yet no governments  behave  that  way.  The usual  reason  given for this  is
that  administrative  considerations  play an important  role.  A mix of taxes keeps the
rate  on  any  one tax  low, thereby  reducing  the incentive  to evade or avoid the  tax.
Furthermore,  by  using  a  mix of taxes,  taxpayers  who would otherwise  be  able  to
avoid taxation  of one type are  caught in the net of another,  making  the tax  system
fairer.  The  importance  of the  various  taxes  in the  overall mix remains,  however,  a
matter  of judgment  rather  than  something  that  can be deduced from the principles.
These  same  general  considerations  apply  in  the  case of assigning  taxes  in  a
federal  government  system.  Efficiency and  equity  arguments  have to  be tempered
by administrative  considerations,  and the exact  assignment  depends  upon  informed
judgment.  We can, however, outline  the  economic principles  that  come into play in
deciding  which  taxes  to assign  to lower levels of government.  They  are as follows:
i.  Efficiency  of the Internal  Common  Market
The  internal  common market  will be functioning  efficiently if all resources  (labor,
capital,  goods and  services) are free to move from one region to another  without  im-
pediments  or distortions  imposed by policy.  Decentralized  tax systems  can interfere
with  the efficiency of the  economic union  in two ways.  For one, the  uncoordinated
setting  of taxes  is likely to  lead  to  distortions  in  markets  for resources  which  are
mobile  across  states,  especially  capital  and  tradeable  goods.  This  problem  will
be  lessened  considerably  if state  governments  recognize that  resources  are mobile.
However,  if they  do recognize  that,  they  may  engage in  socially  wasteful  beggar-
thy-neighbor  policies  to  attract  resources  to  their  own  states.  If all jurisdictions
engage in such policies, the end result  will simply be inefficiently low taxes  (or high
subsidies)  on mobile factors.
ii.  National  Equity
The tax-transfer  system  is one of the main  instruments  for achieving redistributive
equity.  The  argument  for making  equity  a federal  objective  is simply that  all per-
sons  ought  to  enter  into  society's  'social  welfare function'  on an  equal  basis,  and
presumably  the  federal  government  is the  only level that  can ensure  that  residents
in  different  regions  are treated  equitably.  This  may be tempered  if states  have dif-
ferent  tastes  for redistribution,  or  if centralized  decision making  is not  guided  by
7normative  criteria.  To  the  extent  that  equity  is  viewed  as  being  a  federal  policy
objective,  decentralized  taxes  can  interfere  with  the  achievement  of  those  objec-
tives.  As  with  the  efficiency  case,  uncoordinated  state  tax  policies  may  unwittingly
induce  arbitrary  differences  in  redistributive  consequences  for  residents  of different
states.  Also,  given  the  mobility  of labor  and  capital  across  states,  the  states  may
engage  in  perverse  redistributive  policies  using  both  taxes  and  transfers  to  attract
high-income  persons  and  repel  low-income  ones.  Beggar-thy-neighbor  redistributive
policies  are  likely  to  be  offsetting  with  respect  to  resource  allocation,  but  will  result
in  less  redistribution  than  in  their  absence.  (Of  course,  those  who  abhor  redistri-
bution  through  the  government  will  prefer  decentralized  redistributive  policies  for
precisely  the  same  reason.)  This  is  obviously  likely  to  be  more  of  a  problem  for
those  taxes  which  are  redistributive  in nature,  as well  as  for  transfers.
iii.  Administrative  Costs
The  decentralization  of revenue  raising  can  also  serve  to  increase  the  costs  of collec-
tion  and  compliance,  both  for  the  public  sector  and  for  the  private  sector.  There  are
fixed  costs  associated  with  collecting  any  tax  which  will have  to  be  borne  for  each
tax  type  that  is used  by  the  states.  Taxpayers  will also  have  to  incur  costs  of com-
pliance  for  all  taxes  levied.  The  possibilities  for  evasion  and  avoidance  will increase
with  decentralization  for  some  types  of taxes.  This  will  be  true  where  the  tax  base
is mobile,  or  where  the  tax  base  straddles  more  than  one  jurisdiction.  In the  latter
case,  there  will  need  to  be  rules  for  allocating  tax  revenues  among  jurisdictions;  in
their  absence,  some  tax  bases  may  face  either  double  taxation  or  no  taxation  at
all.  Auditing  procedures  may  also  be  distorted  for  those  tax  bases  which  involve
transactions  across  state  boundaries.
iv.  Fiscal  Need
To  ensure  accountability,  revenue  means  should  be  matched  as  closely  as  possible
to  revenue  needs.  Thus  tax  instruments  intended  to  further  specific  policy  objec-
tives  should  be  assigned  to  the  level  of government  having  the  responsibility  for
such  a  service.  Thus  progressive  redistributive  taxes,  stabilization  instruments  and
resource  rent  taxes  would  be  suitable  for  assignment  to  the  national  government;
while  tolls  on  intermunicipal  roads  are  suitably  assigned  to  state  governments.  In
countries  with  a federal  level  VAT,  it  may  be  too  cumbersome  to  have  sub-national
sales  taxes.  In  such  circumstances,  the  fiscal  need  criterion  would  suggest  allowing
subnational  governments  access  to  taxes  which  are  traditionally  regarded  as  more
suitable  for  national  administration,  such  as  personal  income  taxes.
2.  Assignment  by  Type  of  Tax
The  relevance  of each  of the  above  principles  varies  from  tax  base  to  tax  base.  It
will also  depend  upon  how  much  responsibility  for revenue-raising  has  been  devolved
to  the  states.  In  this  section,  we  consider  how  the  principles  apply  to  each  of the
main  types  of  taxes.  Where  relevant,  we  note  particular  issues  and  practices  in
developing  countries.  Of  course,  there  may  be  institutional  impediments  to  the
ability  to  assign  taxes  freely  according  to economic  principles.  In particular,  national
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from  assuming  responsibility  for  certain  types  of taxes.  That  will  obviously  depend
upon  the  country  in  question.  It  may  also  be  the  case  that  the  federal  government
can  override  state  policies  in  certain  countries,  where  the  overriding  is justified  by
national  objectives,  such  as the  maintenence  of an efficient  internal  economic  union.
Thus,  for  examp,e  the  interstate  commerce  clause  in  the  U.S.  constitution  allows
the  federal  government  to  strike  down  state  laws  which  interfere  with  interstate
trading.
i.  Personal  Income  Taxes
Income  taxes  applied  to  individuals  (or  households)  represent  an  important  instru-
ment  for  redistribution.  For redistributive  purposes,  they  should  be  available  to  the
federal  government.  Assignment  of personal  income  taxes  to  the  states  runs  the
risk  of  national  equity  objectives  being  violated  through  different  degrees  of pro-
gressivity  across  states,  and  of beggar-thy-neighbor  state  policies  competing  away
redistribution.
Moreover,  since  capital  income  is  typically  a  component  of these  taxes,  there
is  a  possibility  of  capital  markets  being  distorted.  For  example,  state  income  tax
regimes  could  give  preferential  treatment  to  capital  income  generated  within  the
state.  As well,  because  capital  income  can  be  earned  both  within  the  state  and  out-
side,  compliance  and  collection  costs,  and  the  possibilities  for  evasion,  are  likely  to
increase  substantially  as responsibility  for  personal  income  taxes  are  decentralized.
For  all  these  reasons,  it  is preferable  that  responsibility  for  the  personal  income  tax
rest  with  the  federal  government.
The  same  might  be  said  for  other  direct  taxes  on  persons,  such  as  taxes  on
personal  wealth  and  on  wealth  transfers  (e.g.,  estate  taxes).  Indeed,  the  case  for
centralization  of  these  is perhaps  even  stronger,  given  that  their  bases  are  highly
mobile  and  that  they  are  very  effective  instruments  for  pursuing  equity.  By  the
same  token,  subsidies  to  persons,  which  are  essentially  negative  direct  taxes,  might
also  be  federally  levied  and  integrated  with  the  income  tax  system.
It  should  be  noted  that  in  low-income  agrarian  societies  and  lower-middle  in-
come  countries,  the  coverage  of the  personal  income  tax  is quite  limited  and  its  role
as  a  redistributive  element  of  the  fiscal  system  is  further  clouded  by  widespread
tax  evasion.  Shah  and  Whalley  (1991)  have  argued  that  when  one  considers  the
rural-urban  migration  effects  associated  with  a  tax  on  urban  incomes,  as  well  as
the  reverse  redistribution  effects  of the  income  tax  through  the  bribe  system,  the
personal  income  tax  may  not  be  viewed  as a progressive  element  of the  tax  structure
in  lower-middle  income  countries.  Under  such  circumstances,  an  exclusive  federal
role  for  the  personal  income  tax  is difficult  to  justify.  Further,  many  of the  services
provided  by  sub-national  governments  in  developing  countries  could  not  be  directly
related  to  property  and  are  redistributive  in  nature.  This  suggests  that  while  the
federal  government  may  impose  a  progressive  income  tax  structure,  sub-national
governments  should  be  given  access  to  flat  charges  on  the  federal  base.
To the  extent  that  states  are  allowed  access  to personal  income  tax  revenues,  the
allocation  of tax  base  across  states  becomes  important  to  ensure  that  each  person  is
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employment is preferred.  However,  establishing place of residence may be difficult
if persons move during the tax year.  Assigning proportions of a tax base to each
state according to the share of a tax year spent in the state would be complicated.
Countries with decentralized income tax systems usually assign residency to a given
state  for the entire tax year according to residency on a given date (e.g., the last
day in the year). 
China  has assigned personal income taxation  to  the provincial-local govern-
ments, while retaining for the central government control of the determination of
its  base.  In most other  developing countries, the  determination of the personal
income tax  base and rate  is a central responsibility, whereas tax  administration  is
occasionally shared with  sub-national governments.  Exceptions are India,  where
this tax field is co-occupied by the federal and state governments, and Brazil, where
states  are  allowed a supplementary rate  on the  federal base.  Nigeria is unusual
insofar as the federal government collects only a limited share of income taxes.  It
has access only to taxes paid by the armed forces, external affairs employees, and
residents of the Federal Capital Territory. The predominance of state-level income
tax  collection hinders redistribution.  In some cases, state  governments control in-
struments  other than  the  income tax  which may affect income redistribution.  In
Brazil, for example, the taxes on inheritances, gifts, and supplemental capital gains
are state  levies.
ii.  Corporation Taxes
As with the personal income tax,  the case for making the  corporation income tax
a federal responsibility is strong.  For one thing, the  corporate tax can be viewed
partly as an adjunct to the personal tax, or, more precisely, as a withholding device
for the personal tax, to tax  at source shareholder income which could otherwise be
reinvested in the corporation and escape immediate taxation.  To this extent,  it is
better levied at the same level as the personal tax so that it can be integrated easily.
In an open economy,  the  corporate tax also serves as a useful device for obtaining
revenues from foreign corporations, especially those that  are  able to  obtain  tax
credits  from their  home governments.  Again, the  federal level seems the  most
appropriate one for this purpose. More to the point, since the corporate tax base is
capital income within a jurisdiction, decentralizing it to the states would  jeopardize
the efficient  functioning of capital markets and give rise to the possibility of wasteful
tax competition to attract  capital at the expense of other jurisdictions.
Administrative simplicity also favors centralizing  the corporate tax.  Since  many
corporations operate in more than one jurisdiction at the same time, tax  adminis-
tration  in a multi-jurisdiction setting can be a complicated matter.  For any given
jurisdiction, the appropriate share of the tax base must be allocated to that juris-
diction, and the  taxing authority  must have some way of monitoring the  firm to
ensure compliance. With  complete independence of taxing authorities, this would
be difficult.  The firm may well have an incentive to engage in transfer pricing or
financial and  book transactions  to  shift its profits around to  reduce its tax  bur-
den.  The firm itself will have an increased cost of compliance if it faces different
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among  sub-national  jurisdictions  according  to  methods  of formula  apportionment
which  attempt  to  minimize  the  administrative  and  incentive  problems  associated
with  determining  tax  shares.  Common  methods  include  allocating  tax  revenues  of
a  given corporation  among jurisdictions  according  to  a mix of shares  of the  firm's
payroll,  revenues,  and  possibly  capital  stocks.
Thus,  the  case  for  centralizing  the  corporate  tax  is very  strong.  The  same
might  be  said  for  other  taxes  which  effectively  fall  on  corporate  capital,  such  as
capital  taxes.  And,  by  symmetric  arguments,  subsidies  to  corporations  should  be
centralized,  given the  obvious tendency  for lower levels of government  to  use them
to  attract  capital  in  competition  with  other  jurisdictions  in ways which  might  be
distorting.
Of course,  not  all  tax  competition  need  be  wasteful;  it  could  also  serve  to
improve  the efficiency of lower level governments.  Some of the  distorting  effect of
tax  competition  could  be  avoided  if  the  taxes  involved  were designed  to  be  non-
discriminatory  so that  they treated  all capital  within  their  jurisdictions  alike.  This
is equivalent  to  the  so-called  principle  of  national  treatment  in international  trade
policy.
In most  developing  countries,  the determination  of the corporate  tax  base  and
rate  structure  is a central government  responsibility.  However, collection and admin-
istration  is sometimes  decentralized.  Administration  of the  corporate  tax  is a joint
responsibility  of national  and sub-national  governments in Pakistan  and  the Russian
Federation.  In China,  corporate  tax  collection  is divided  among federal,  provincial
and  local  governments  (although  the  federal  government  retains  sole authority  to
set  the  base  and  rates).  The  provincial  and  local governments  are responsible  for
collecting  taxes from provincially-owned  and locally-owned enterprises,  respectively.
The federal  government  collects taxes on their  own enterprises  as well as on foreign-
owned enterprises  and  all domestically  owned private  enterprises.  Indeed,  this  pat-
tern  of the  federal  government  setting  the  base  and  rate  structure  combined  with
some decentralization  of collection  applies  to  all major  taxes  in  Chinas,  including
sales  and  excise taxes.  There  are  cases in  which sub-national  governments  control
instruments  which  may  affect capital  mobility.  In  India,  for  example,  the  capital
transactions  tax  is a state  instrument.
iii.  Sales  Taxes
Sales taxes  are much better  candidates  for decentralization  to the  states,  especially
if significant  revenue  sources  are required.  Typically,  general  sales taxes  are levied
on consumption  goods  defined with  varying  degrees of inclusiveness,  and  on a des-
tination  basis.  As such,  they are essentially  general  taxes on residents  of the taxing
jurisdiction.  Given  the  relatively  low degree  of mobility  of households,  they  are
likely to  be  much less  distorting  than,  say, taxes  on mobile  bases  like capital  (at
least  as long as investment  goods are not  included  in the base).  As well, since sales
taxes  are not  significant  instruments  for redistribution,  little  is lost from  an  equity
point  of view from  decentralizing  them  to the  states.
There  are,  however,  some  distortions  and  administrative  problems  likely  to
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border  shopping.  Residents  of high-tax  jurisdictions  will have an incentive  to  shop
in neighboring  low-tax jurisdictions  to  reduce their  tax burdens.  Given the absence
of border  controls,  this will be difficult to  avoid. As a consequence, tax  competition
will likely  result  in  rate  levels  and  structures  which  do  not  vary  greatly  across
jurisdictions.  On the surface of it, this  might pose a problem for poorer  jurisdictions
that  might  otherwise  need higher tax  rates to finance their  basic services.  However,
this  disadvantage  would  be mitigated  if an effective system  of equalizing  transfers
from  the  federal  government  were in place,  as discussed in the  previous  section.
If the state  sales taxes  take the form of sub-national  credit-method  value-added
taxes (VATs), the taxation  of interstate  trade  creates  major  difficulties.  Such trans-
actions  can either  be  taxed  on a destination  basis  (taxing  final consumption)  such
that  imports  are taxed  and  exports  are  zero rated;  or on  an  origin  basis  (taxing
production)  such that  both  imports  and exports  are exempted  from taxation.  Since
the use of the  destination  basis for a VAT requires customs  houses at state  borders
within  a federation,  and  thereby  works  as an impediment  to  the free flow of goods
and  services within  the  nation,  a possible  alternative  is to  adopt  the  so-called  "re-
stricted  origin principle",  where interstate  trade  is taxed  on the origin principle  and
international  trade  on  a  destination  basis.  This  solution  would  work well if sub-
national  units  had  uniform rates of VATs and if trade  flows within  and from outside
the  country  were not  too uneven across states  (see also McLure,  1993). Inefficiences
could result if the taxation  basis differed across jurisdictions;  for example,  state  gov-
ernments  might  be tempted  to  use an origin basis for their  state  taxes  rather  than
a residency  one.  These  problems  might  be mitigated  by joint  federal-sub-national
administration  of the  VAT.
Other  possible inefficiencies of state  sales taxation  are related  to administrative
problems,  which are certainly  likely to be present  in developing  countries.  One has
to  do with  the  fact  that  the  broader  the  basej  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  enforce
compliance.  To  get  a  fully general  consumption  base,  including  both  goods  and
services, it would be practically  necessary to collect the tax  at the level of final sales
to  the  consumer,  the  retail  stage.  This  increases  the  compliance  costs considerably
since the number  of taxpayers  would be extremely  large.  Furthermore,  enforcement
of the  tax  becomes  very  difficult,  and  evasion is likely  to  be  high.  Some of these
difficulties  can be  avoided by levying the tax  at an earlier  stage,  though  at the  cost
of making  the base  much narrower.
Another  problem  with  state  sales taxes is that  it is difficult to avoid some cas-
cading  of the  tax  through  purchases  of taxed  inputs.  Systems  in which taxes  paid
on purchases  from  registered  dealers  are credited  towards  or  exempted  from  later
levies reduce  the  incidence of this  problem  at some administrative  cost, but  do not
eliminate  it entirely.  A related  issue is the difficulty in ensuring  that  sales to buyers
outside  state  boundaries  have been purged  of taxes  on intermediate  inputs.  These
same problems  arise at  the federal  level and  are typically  addressed  by adopting  a
multi-stage  tax  such as a value-added  tax  (VAT). Under  a VAT, taxes  on business
inputs  are eliminated  by the  system  of crediting  for  input  purchases,  exports  are
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ing the  same remedy  at the  state  level is difficult because  of the  absence  of border
controls.  Furthermore,  since states  are inevitably  much more open than  entire  coun-
tries,  the  administrative  complexities  of operating  a system  of taxing  and  crediting
on  all cross-border  transactions  would be  very high  and  would likely constitute  a
significant  distortion  on inter-state  trade.  For these reasons,  single-stage  state  sales
taxes  may well be preferred.6
Quite apart  from these  difficulties of dealing with  cross-border  transactions  by
both  producers  and  consumers,  state  sales taxes  entail  a separate  layer of admin-
istrative  machinery  on  the  government  side,  and  additional  compliance  costs  for
businesses  who are  required  to  collect the  tax.  These  costs are  especially  high  in
a  system  in  which  there  are  separate  sales  taxes  at  the  federal  and  state  levels of
government.
The  practical  difficulties associated  with  the  sub-national  administration  of a
multi-stage  sales tax  are well illustrated  by the  Brazilian  experience.  In Brazil,  the
federal  government  levies a manufacturer  level sales tax  (IPI);  states  are assigned  a
broad-based  credit-method  VAT (ICMS at 17% rate);  and municipalities  administer
a services tax  (ISS).  Under  the ICMS, interstate  sales are taxed  on the  origin prin-
ciple  (at  a  12% rate  for North-South  and  a 7% rate  for  South-North  transactions)
and  international  trade  is taxed  on  a  destination  basis.  Thus  in  domestic  trade,
relatively  less developed  northern  states  are given preferential  treatment.  In  inter-
national  trade,  as most  of the  imports  are  destined  for the  Southern  states  and  a
disproportionate  amount  of exports  go through  the Northeastern  states,  most of the
revenues  are  collected  by the  richer  states  and  export  rebates  are given by poorer
states.  Another  emerging  area  of major  potential  interstate  conflict is the  use  of
the  ICMS  as a  tool for state  industrial  development.  Some northeastern  states  are
offering  15-year  ICMS  tax  deferral  to  industry.  In  a  highly  inflationary  environ-
ment  such  as Brazil,  unless  such tax  liabilities  are indexed, they  have the potential
to  wipe out  all ICMS tax  liabililties.
Recognizing  these  difficulties,  China  is  introducing  a  centrally  administered
VAT with  proceeds  to  be  shared  with  the  provinces.  Effective  January  1, 1994,
the  provinces  will be  given 25% of VAT revenues  and  the federal  government  the
remainder.  India is facing major  difficulties in reforming its sales tax system.  At the
present  time,  sales taxes  are assigned  to the  state  level; excises are administered  by
the federal  government  and  the proceeds shared  with  the states;  while the  octroi  is
a local  tax  on intermunicipal  trade.  Sales taxes  are administered  on narrow  bases;
the  number  of rates  vary  by  state  from  six in  Orissa  to  seventeen  in  Bihar  and
Gujarat.  Some states  consider the sales tax  an important  element  of redistributive
policy.  To reform  the  existing  sales  tax  structure,  a  broad  based  national  value-
added  tax  has been proposed,  but  this  is strongly  opposed  by the states.  The states
are also dissatisfied  with the centrally-administered  excise tax because it limits their
powers of taxation.  The federal government  prefers to raise additional  revenues from
6  For a contrary view, see Burgess, Howes and  Stern (1993), who have advocated a
system of state VATs for India.
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to  be  shared  with  state  governments.  The octroi  tax  on intermunicipal  trade  is a
source  of significant  revenues for local governments  and  remains  popular  inspite  of
its  anti-trade  bias.
iv.  Exczise Taxes
Specific  excise  taxes  are  also  good  candidates  for  decentralization  to  the  states,
perhaps  even better  than general  sales taxes,  although  they have much less potential
for raising  revenues.  (Obviously,  we are not  including  customs  duties  and  export
taxes  in this;  they  should  clearly  be  federal  responsibilities.)  Specific  excises are
unlikely  to cause significant  impediments  to  the efficiency of the internal  economic
union  or major  misallocations  of labor and  capital if they are levied on a destination
basis.  They  simply  become  a  form  of taxes  on residents  and  are  unlikely  to  be
significant  enough  to  cause migration.  If they  were levied  on an  origin  basis,  this
might  not  be  the  case; businesses could  avoid the  tax by moving elsewhere,  unless
the product  taxed  depended  upon  a local resource.  An example of the latter  might
be taxes  on oil and  gas, to  which we return  below when discussing  resource  taxes.
From  an  efficiency point  of view,  there  are  two  problems  with  excise  taxes.
For one, as with  sales  taxes,  they  will give rise to  cross-border  shopping  problems,
possibly  on  a  large  scale  given that  the  taxed  goods  may  be  cheap  to  transport.
Tax  competition  is likely to  reduce  the  importance  of this,  especially  if the  fiscal
capacities  of the  states  are not  too  different  and  if equalizing  transfers  further  re-
duce discrepancies.  Another  possible problem  arises from the fact  that  excise taxes
distort  the  markets  for the  goods being  taxed.  This  distortion  can  be  significant
if states  must  rely on excise taxes  for a large part  of their  revenues.  Of course,  it
could be  argued  that,  for  some goods,  at  least  some  differential  tax  is justified  on
the  basis of externalities.  Alcohol and  tobacco  taxes are good examples  of this,  and
gasoline taxes  might  also be  so considered.
Excise  taxes  may  have  an  adverse  effect  on  equity  to  the  extent  that  they
are  levied  on  goods  consumed  by lower-income  persons.  However,  this  need  not
be  a  telling  problem  as long  as the  federal  government  has  at  its  disposal  other
tax  instruments  for addressing  redistributive  issues on a broader  basis,  such as the
income-based  tax-transfer  system.  There  might,  however,  be  other  federal  policy
objectives  which  are  affected  by excise tax  policy.  For example,  the  federal  gov-
ernment  may have a concern  with  health  policy, the  effectiveness of which may  be
influenced  by  cigarette  and  alcohol  taxes,  or  with  pollution  and  road  use,  where
gasoline  taxes  become  relevant.
Excises  on  alcohol  and  tobacco  could  be  jointly  occupied  by the  federal  and
provincial  levels, as both  health  care and  the  prevention  of accidents  and  crimes  is
usually  a shared  responsibility  in most  federations.  Games of chance and  gambling
usually fall within the purview of state  and local governments  and therefore  taxes on
betting,  gambling,  racetracks  and lottery  revenues would be suitable  for assignment
to  subnational  governments  only.
Taxation  to  control  environmental  externalities  such  as congestion  and  pollu-
tion  could be  suitably  imposed by the level of government  having  the responsibility
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bat  global  and  national  pollution  issues should  be  a  federal  responsibility.  BTU
taxes,  taxes on motor fuels and  congestion tolls could be levied by all levels in their
own sphere  of authority.  Effluent  charges  to  deal with  interstate  pollution  should
be a federal  responsibility.  Intermunicipal  pollution  would be a state  responsibility
but  the  responsibility  to  deal with  intra-municipal  pollution  should  rest  with  local
governments.  Parking  fees to  influence  inter-modal  choices  and  thereby  regulate
local traffic  congestion  should a local  responsibility.
Relative  to other  taxes,  the administrative  problems associated  with  decentral-
izing excise taxes  are  less severe.  The  difficulties of eliminating  taxes  on  business
inputs  and  on exports  that  plague  general  sales taxes  do not  apply  with  the  same
force here.  Collection  costs may not  be excessively high for either  the sellers or the
government.  Enforcement  should  be  no greater  a problem  than  with  other  taxes,
especially  if the  rates  are neither  too high  nor too  varied across  the federation.
A large  variation  in excise tax  assignment  prevails  in developing  countries.  In
some countries,  such Indonesia  and  Mexico, they are centralized.  In others,  such as
Bangladesh  and  Argentina,  they are decentralized.  In a large majority  of developing
countries,  excise taxes  are  co-occupied  by  national  and  subnational  governments;
this  is the  case in Malaysia,  Nigeria and  Thailand.
v.  Payroll  Taxes
Payroll  taxes  are typically  used  in industrialized  countries  for financing  social  in-
surance  schemes, especially  those  limited  to  employees.  The  sorts of programs  for
which  payroll  taxes  are  often earmarked  may  be  those  which  are  decentralized  to
state  governments,  in  which case they  would be obvious  sources of state  revenues.
However, they can be a useful adjunct  to general revenue financing  as well. In either
case, they  are ideal candidates  for state  revenue sources.  Payroll taxes are relatively
easy  to  administer  since they  can  be  collected  with  minimal  cost  through  payroll
deduction.  Their  base is ultimately  almost  equivalent  to that  of general  sales taxes.
Provided  their  rates  do  not  differ significantly  across  states,  they  are unlikely  to
cause significant  distortions  in the  labor  market.
As well as causing very little  distortion  of internal  labor  markets,  payroll taxes
have minimal  redistributive  effects.  They are not  a necessary  component  of federal
redistributive  policy  instruments,  and  any  adverse effect they  may have on income
distribution  can be  easily offset by other  taxes  at the  federal level.
Payroll  taxes  are widely used in Latin  American  countries.  There  is the poten-
tial for greater  use of this tax instrument  by sub-national  governments  in developing
countries.
vi.  Resource  Taxes
The  case of taxes on resources  is an interesting  one since it brings the two economic
criteria,  efficiency and  equity, into  direct  conflict.  On the  one hand,  since resource
endowments  are immobile across jurisdictions,  state  taxes  on resources,  if designed
properly,  should not  distort  the internal  economic union.  Indeed,  taxes on resource
rents  would  in  a  sense be  an  ideal  tax  since they  would have no efficiency effects
15whatsoever. 7 The  administrative  costs  associated  with  state  resource  taxes  would
not be excessive either.  At the same time, resources  tend often to be distributed  very
unevenly  across  states  in  a  given country.  In  these  circumstances,  decentralizing
resource  taxes  to  the states  would result  in significant differences in tax  capacities,
thus  creating  fiscal inefficiencies and inequities.
In an ideal  world, the decentralization  of resource revenues to the states  would
be  accompanied  by a  set  of equalizing  federal  provincial  transfers  to  alleviate  the
NFB  differences that  would otherwise  result.  However, full equalization  of tax  ca-
pacities  is rarely  implemented.  Thus,  one might opt  for maintaining  federal  control
of those  resources  that  are more likely to  be  important  and  unequally  distributed,
such  as oil and  gas,  while decentralizing  others  which  are less important,  such  as
mining  and  perhaps  forestry.  The decentralization  of these  resource  bases also  en-
ables  states  to  engage  in  resource  management  and  conservation  practices  within
their  jurisdictions.
In  practice,  resource  tax  bases  tend  not  to  coincide  with  rents  and  thus  re-
source  taxes  do have efficiency effects.  They  often  distort  capital  and  employment
decisions.  States  might  be tempted  to use them  as instruments  to attract  economic
activity  to  their  jurisdictions,  thereby  violating  the  efficiency of the  internal  eco-
nomic  union.  Thus,  what  could ideally  be  a fully efficient source  of state  revenue
could turn  out  to  be  a highly  distortionary  tax  type.  In  these  circumstances,  the
case for decentralized  control  is weakened.
However, some resource taxes, such as royalties and fees and severance  taxes on
production  and/or  output,  are designed to cover costs of local service provision  and
could be assigned to local governments.  In addition,  sub-national  governments  could
also  impose  taxes  to  discourage  local  environmental  degradation.  This  rationale
explains  the  practice  in  Canada,  Australia  and  the  U.S.  of having  intermediate
level governments  (in the case of U.S., local governments  as well) impose such taxes
on natural  resources.
Resource  taxes  in  developing  countries  are  typically  a  central  government  re-
sponsibility.  In a few countries,  such as Colombia  and  the Russian  Federation,  tax
administration  is decentralized  to  subnational  governments.  Important  exceptions
to  central  domination  in  this  area  include  Malaysia,  where  resource  taxes  are  a
shared  responsibility  among federal  and  state  governments,  and  India,  where  such
taxation  is solely a state  responsibility.
vii.  Property  Taxes
Taxes on real property  are usually mainstays  of local finance,  and with  good reason.
Real property  is immobile  across jurisdictions  so the  efficiency costs of using it as a
tax  base are low. Moreover, it can be argued  that  many benefits  of local public  ser-
vices accrue to property  owners, so the tax serves as a sort of benefit tax.  Of course,
there  are  costs  incurred  in  administering  property  taxes,  and  considerable  discre-
tion  is involved in  arriving  at property  values for the  purposes  of taxation.  Thus,
7  For a general discussion of the way in which resource taxes  could be designed to
capture rents, see Boadway and Flatters  (1993).
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property  taxes,  though  not  necessarily  in setting  local rates.
Just  as  different  states  may  have  different  fiscal capacities  and  can  provide
different  levels of NFBs  to  their  citizens,  so municipalities  have different  fiscal ca-
pacities,  particularly  with respect  to real property  tax bases.  The case for equalizing
transfers  among municipalities  within  states is as strong  as that  for similar transfers
across states.  Of course,  it would be the state  which made the  transfer  rather  than
the federal  government.
In industrial  countries,  a  common practice  regarding  property  development  is
for local governments  to require  developers to  provide basic infrastructure  in a new
subdivision  - the  so-called  practice  of gold plating  or exactions.  Such  a practice
has potential  applications  in developing  countries.
The  assignment  of property  taxes  varies  across  developing  countries.  In  In-
donesia,  property  taxes  are  a  central  government  responsibility.  In  Brazil,  China
and  the  Phillipines,  the responsibility  is shared  among federal,  state  and  local  gov-
ernments.  Property  taxation  is a  state-local  responsibility  in  Argentina,  Malaysia
and  Pakistan.  In  most  other  developing  countries,  such  as Bangladesh,  Colombia,
Mexico, Nigeria,  Papua  New Guinea  and  Thailand,  it is a solely local  responsibil-
ity.  Thus,  significant  potential  exists  for the  decentralization  of property  taxes  in
developing  countries.  Colombia  has  successfully  experimented  with  a  tax  on  ur-
ban  property  value increases  (valorization  tax)  to finance infrastructure  investment
projects  which were responsible  for the improvements  in property  values.  The city
of  Jakarta,  Indonesia  is  experimenting  with  a  betterment  levy  to  finance  urban
infrastructure  improvement  projects.
Developing  countries  also frequently  levy agricultural  land  taxes.  Taxes based
on land  area,  the  market  value of agricultural  land,  the productivity  potential  and
market  access of the land have been used as a source of central  government  revenues
in many developing countries.  These taxes are more suitable  for assignment  to local
governments.
viii.  Pricing for  Public  Services
A potentially  important  source  of funds for publicly-provided  services that  are pri-
vate in nature  is the pricing of those services by such things  as user fees and licenses.
These  are especially  relevant for local and  some state  public  services since these are
often  private  in  nature.  The  case  for pricing  of public  services is  clearest  where
the  service  in  question  is not  provided  publicly  for redistributive  reasons.  Many
local  services  are of this  sort,  including  water,  garbage,  local  utilities  and  recre-
ational  facilities.  An  advantage  of pricing  for  public  services,  in  addition  to  its
pure  revenue-raising  role, is that  efficient use of the services can be promoted.  This
can  be  useful  both  for rationing  available  supplies  and  for determining  how many
resources  to devote  to providing  the service.  That  is not to say that  pricing  is distri-
butionally  neutral  in these  cases; indeed,  many of these  services are necessities  and
form  an  important  part  of consumption  by lower income  persons.  However, in  an
economy  with  a  well-developed  public  sector,  distributive  objectives  are probably
better  left  to  higher  levels of government  rather  than  being  a  component  of each
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On the other hand, some important quasi-private public services are provided
by the public sector largely for redistributive reasons, including health and educa-
tion. Relying heavily on user fees to finance these services would seem to contradict
this objective. That  does not preclude limited amounts of pricing, for example, to
cut down on overuse of medical services.
In any case, these sources of revenues are likely to be more important  to lower
levels of government, whose services tend  to be private  in nature.  User pricing
should not  have an adverse effect on resource allocation.  Nor is it costly to  ad-
minister since it is simply an application of the fee-for-service  principle.  And, as
mentioned, any adverse effects on equity can be addressed more effectively  by poli-
cies of a more general nature applied by higher levels of government.
In summary, this discussion of the assignment of taxes makes it clear that  the
case for decentralizing taxing powers is not as compelling  as that  for decentralizing
public service delivery. Lower level taxes can introduce inefficiencies  in the alloca-
tion of resources across the federation and can cause inequities among persons of
different jurisdictions.  As well, collection and compliance costs can increase signif-
icantly. These problems seem to be more severe for some taxes than for others, so
the selection of which taxes to decentralize must be done with care. In the end, a
balance must be reached between the need to  achieve fiscal and political account-
ability at  the  lower levels of government and the  disadvantages, from a national
point of view, of having a fragmented tax  system.  In virtually all countries, the
balance involves a fiscal gap between adjacent levels of government.
The trade-off between increased accountability and increased economic costs
from decentralizing taxing responsibilities can be mitigated by the  fiscal arrange-
ments that exist between levels of government. We have already mentioned the fact
that the system of fiscal transfers can serve to reduce the fiscal inefficiencies  and in-
equities that  arise from different fiscal capacities across states.  In addition to this,
some of the fragmentation  that  would otherwise occur from decentralizing taxes
can be mitigated by joint occupation and harmonization of taxes among different
jurisdictions.  That will be discussed in the next section.
3.  Co-occupation  of Tax Bases
Taxes need not be exclusively assigned to one level of government or another, but
may be occupied simultaneously by both.  Examples exist in which income taxes
are levied by both federal and state governments (United States, Canada), general
sales taxes  are  levied by both  federal and  state  governments (Canada),  payroll
taxes are levied by both  federal and state governments (Canada) and excise taxes
are levied by both federal and state governments (Canada, United States).  Indeed,
even municipal governments may share income or sales tax bases (as in the United
States).
The co-occupation of tax bases can be done with varying degrees of coordina-
tion.  At one extreme, there may be no formal coordination in the  sense that  both
levels of government set their own policies independently.  Even in  this case, tax
policies will not be completely unrelated.  For any given tax base, there is a limit
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tax  room  available  for one level of government  will depend  upon  that  occupied  by
the  other.  The  division of the  tax  room  can affect the  degree of harmonization  in
an otherwise  uncoordinated  system.  For example, the greater  the proportion  of the
tax  room  occupied  by the federal  government,  the  more likely it  is that  the  states
will adopt  tax structures  which are similar to those  of the federal government.  This
may be important  for tax bases, like the income tax,  that  are important  instruments
for achieving  national  objectives.  Indeed,  determining  the  amounts  of tax  room  of
various  taxes  the federal  government  should occupy is an important  policy decision
in a  decentralized  federation.
Alternative  forms  of coordination  of co-occupied  tax  bases  can  exist.  At  the
least there  may be an exchange of taxpayer  information  and other auditing  informa-
tion.  There may be agreement  on the formulas for the allocation  of tax bases among
jurisdictions.  There  may  be  agreements  on  the  bounds  of tax  rates  for sales  and
excise taxes.  Common  bases may be agreed  upon,  or even common rate  structures.
A common  collection  machinery  may be adopted.  In the limit, there  may be highly
centralized  tax  systems  with  agreed  upon  tax  sharing  formulas.  The  next  section
considers  in more  detail  the  consequences  of different  degrees of coordination  and
harmonization.
To summarize  this  discussion of tax  assignment,  Tables 1 presents  in summary
form  the  main  arguments  for  assignment  of the  various  taxes  to  the  three  main
levels of government  - federal,  state  and  local.  A broad  view  of  the  extent  of
decentralization  of tax bases in a sample of fifteen developing  countries  is presented
in Table  2.
IV.  TAX  HARMONIZATION  AND  COORDINATION
The  harmonization  of tax  systems  in  a federation,  like the  system  of intergovern-
mental  transfers,  is a means by which the advantages  of decentralized  fiscal decision
making  can be  accomplished  without  excessively jeopardizing  the  efficient and  eq-
uitable  functioning  of the  national  economy.  In  this  section,  we discuss  first  the
purpose  of tax  harmonization  from  a general  perspective  and  then  outline  some of
the  alternative  ways in which harmonization  can be achieved.
1.  The  Objectives  of Tax  Harmonization
Tax competition  among jurisdictions  can be beneficial by encouraging  cost-effective-
ness  and  fiscal accountability  in  state  governments.  It  can also  by itself lead  to  a
certain  amount  of tax  harmonization.  At the  same time,  decentralized  tax  policies
can  cause  certain  inefficiencies  and  inequities  in  a  federation  as  well as  lead  to
excessive  administrative  costs.  Tax harmonization  is intended  to preserve  the best
features  of tax  decentralization  while avoiding its disadvantages.
Inefficiencies from decentralized  decision making can occur in a variety  of ways.
For  one,  states  may  implement  policies  which  discriminate  in  favor  of their  own
residents  and  businesses  relative  to  those  of other  states.  They  may  also  engage
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states.  Inefficiency  may also occur  simply from  the fact  that  distortions  will arise
from  differential  tax  structures  chosen  independently  by  state  governments  with
no  strategic  objective  in  mind.  Inefficiencies  also  can  occur  if state  tax  systems
adopt  different  conventions  for dealing with  businesses  (and residents)  who operate
in more  than  one jurisdiction  at  the  same time.  This  can lead  to  double  taxation
of some forms of income and  non-taxation  of others.
State  tax  systems  may also introduce  inequities  into the  tax system.  Different
states  may have differing degrees of progressivity  in their  tax  structures,  and  these
may  differ considerably  from  national  equity  norms  of the federal  government.  To
the  extent  that  one  views  the  federal  government  as being  responsible  for redis-
tributive  equity,  this  makes their  task  more  difficult.  States  may also  be  induced
by  competitive  pressures  to  implement  tax  measures  which  appear  to  be  regres-
sive from  a national  perspective.  For instance,  the  mobility  of either  high-income
or  low-income  persons  would encourage  them  to  set  tax  structures  which  are less
progressive  than  they  would otherwise  be.
Administrative  costs  are  also  likely  to  be  excessive in  an  uncoordinated  tax
system.  This  is especially true  if the states  and  the federal government  both  occupy
a given tax  field.  Taxpayer  compliance  is costly because  of the  need  to  deal  with
more  than  one  different  tax  system.  Auditing  and  collection  costs  are  likely  to
be higher  as  well, as  taxpayers  may  be  able to  engage in  tax  avoidance  by  cross-
border  transactions  of  a  book  nature  and  authorities  cannot  obtain  information
from  operations  in  other jurisdictions.  In  addition,  the  auditing  priorities  of state
governments  may  themselves  become  skewed in  favor  of generating  revenue  from
non-residents  or from residents  doing  business outside  the jurisdiction.
Tax harmonization  is intended  to eliminate  some of these excesses.  At the same
time,  a harmonized  tax  system  can serve as a useful  complement  to  the  system  of
intergovernmental  transfers.  For one thing,  taxes  which  are harmonized  vertically
can be used as devices for getting revenues to state governments  through  tax sharing.
For another,  if taxes are harmonized  across states,  equalizing transfers  based  on tax
capacities  of states  are easier to  implement.
The  importance  of tax  harmonization  varies by  type  of tax.  Taxes  on  busi-
nesses, such as corporation  income taxes,  are good  candidates  for harmonization  to
the  extent  that  they  are  used by  state  governments.  They  apply  to  a mobile  tax
base,  and would otherwise pose significant administrative  costs if left uncoordinated.
Personal  income  taxes  would  also benefit  from  some harmonization.  Compliance
costs  to  taxpayers  and  collection  costs  to  governments  could be  reduced.  Distor-
tionary  treatment  of capital  income could be mitigated.  In addition,  national  equity
objectives  could be  addressed  through  harmonization  measures.  The  case for har-
monizing  sales  and  excise  taxes  is less  compelling.  The  main  inefficiencies here
result  from  cross-border  shopping  problems,  and  those  are likely to  be handled  by
tax  competition  among jurisdictions.  There  could be  some  administrative  savings
by having  a coordinated  system  of sales taxes  between  the  federal  government  and
the  states  to  reduce  the  compliance  cost  to  sellers and  to  economize  on  auditing
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should  the  states  attempt  to  operate  a VAT system.  In  this  case, harmonization
alone is unlikely to overcome the problems of dealing with  cross-border  transactions
in a federation  without  border  controls.  For other  tax bases,  such as payroll  taxes,
property  taxes  and  user  fees,  the  advantages  of harmonization  would  seem to  be
minimal.
2.  Methods  of  Tax  Harmonization
Varying  degrees of tax  harmonization  are possible  depending  on the  degree  of de-
centralization  in  the  tax  system.  The  following are  listed  in  decreasing  order  of
centralization,  focusing  largely on systems of harmonization  encompassing  both  the
federal  government  and  the  states.
i.  At  one  extreme,  a full tax  sharing  arrangement  may  exist  whereby  the  federal
government  determines  the  tax  base  and  rate  structure  (perhaps  in  consultation
with  the  states),  and  simply  agrees  to  share  a  certain  proportion  of it  with  the
states.  This  is basically  analogous  to  an  unconditional  grant  scheme with  the  size
of the  grant  dependent  upon  total  tax  collections.  The  sharing  formula  could  be
based  on the principle  of derivation,  or on some other formula including  a simple one
like equal  per  capita  shares.  Though  this  scheme is certainly  fully harmonized,  the
states  are purely  passive recipients  of revenues collected by the federal government,
so the  advantages  of decentralizing  tax responsibility  are absent.  Obviously,  a fully
uniform  tax  structure  is achieved  and  national  equity  and  efficiency goals  can  be
pursued  at minimal  administrative  cost.  Virtually  any type  of tax  could be shared
in this  way.
ii.  The  advantages  of a single system  can  be  retained  while at  the  same  time  al-
lowing  the  states  some responsibility  for revenue  raised  in  their  jurisdiction.  For
example,  the federal  government  could determine  both  the base  and  rate  structure
for a  particular  type  of tax  and  choose the rate  level so as to generate  the  amount
of revenue  they need from the tax.  The states  could then  piggy back on the federal
base and  rate  structure  by setting  a state  tax rate  to apply to federal  tax  liabilities
that  would determine  how much revenue is owing to  the state.  The federal  govern-
ment  would  collect the  tax on behalf  of the state  and  pass on each state's  share  of
the  revenue  to  them.  There  would need to  be  an  allocation  formula  to  determine
allocation  of the  tax  base  among  states.  In  the  case of personal  income  taxes,  it
could  be  based  on the  residence  of taxpayers.  For corporate  taxes,  the  allocation
formula  might  be based  on some measure of the amount  of profits generated  in each
state.  This  is difficult to do with  precision  given that  many  corporate  activities  af-
fect profits  across  the nation  (administrative  overheads,  research  and  development,
advertising,  etc.).  Furthermore,  allocation  by profits would provide  an incentive for
corporations  to engage in book  transactions  in order  to take  their  profits in low-tax
states.  Allocation  formulas  actually  used  tend  to  be  based  on such  things  as  the
share  of payrolls  in  each  state,  the  share  of revenues,  the  share  of capital  stock,
or  some  combination  of those.  Such  a  system  combines  a  high  degree  of harmo-
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of some revenue raising responsibility to the states.  It is ideally suited to personal
and corporate income taxes where harmonization is desired for national equity and
efficiency  reasons.
However, in some contexts it might have some disadvantages.  For example,
if the  states  occupy significant tax  room for the harmonized tax,  they  may feel
constrained by an inability to use the base or rate structure for policy purposes. In
the case of sales taxes, such a system might constrain the type of tax operated by
the federal government. For example, if the federal government wished to operate a
VAT, it would be difficult to allow the provinces  to piggy back onto it while setting
their own VAT level (let alone their exemptions). The process of crediting that  is
entailed by a VAT would be very cumbersome for intermediate transactions across
state borders. An alternative would  be to have the states levy single-stage sales taxes
with  the same final base as the federal VAT and a common collection procedure.
The problems with monitoring cross-border transactions would disappear, but some
of the advantages of a VAT would be lost (such as purging final sales of taxes levied
on inputs at earlier stages).
iii.  The degree of harmonization could be reduced by allowing states  to  do more
than  simply set a rate to  apply to federal tax  liabilities.  States  could be allowed
to set their own rate  structures, and apply them to the federal base.  Part  of this
would involve setting their  own systems of exemptions, deductions and  credits.
Alternatively, they could be allowed to participate with the federal government in
the choice of the base.  States could also participate in collection procedures (e.g.,
auditing); indeed, they may have a great interest in doing so if their taxes include
certain items of interest to them  but  not to the federal government (tax  credits,
allocations of tax revenue to their jurisdiction, etc.)
iv. State and federal taxes could co-exist side by side in the same area with separate
collection machinery, but  with some agreement over such things as the  base, the
rate structure,  and formula for allocating revenues among states.  This could give
a considerable amount of harmonization while at  the same time retaining a great
deal of decentralized responsibility for tax  policy. Even this extent of harmoniza-
tion might be important  in fields like corporate and personal income taxes where
national efficiency  and equity objectives are at stake. Of course, the administrative
advantages of having a single tax collecting authority would be lost.
v.  It  is not necessary for the federal government to  co-occupy a tax base for har-
monization to occur.  States may occupy bases by themselves and still have some
agreement concerning bases, rate structure,  allocation formulas and the  like.  At
the least they could have agreements to exchange information on taxpayers so as to
improve compliance. Agreements among states to harmonize taxes is analogous to
tax treaties among nations.
vi.  Finally, harmonization need not require formal agreements among states.  Tax
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bases  in  the  case of income  taxes  or indirect  tax  rates.  As mentioned  earlier,  the
disadvantage  of this is that  it does not rule out  the possibility of beggar-thy-neighbor
tax  policies  being implemented  by the  states.
V.  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  TAX  REFORM
Much  of the  above discussion  has been from  an  abstract  perspective  and  has been
based  on principles  of fiscal federalism that  have been largely conceived for industri-
alized countries.  Although  the principles  are basically universal  ones, their  applica-
tion  to  developing  countries  will need to be constrained  by institutional  features  of
those  countries.  There  are some key ways in which the fiscal systems  of developing
countries  differ from those in industrialized  countries  and  this  may temper  reforms.
First,  public  sectors  in  developing  countries  tend  to  focus on  different  policy
objectives.  In industrialized  economies, government  spending  is comparatively  more
oriented  towards  redistributive  objectives,  using  such instruments  as transfers,  so-
cial insurance  and  provision  of basic public  services that  effectively redistribute  in
kind.  This  means  that  the  tax system  is relatively  less important  as an instrument
for redistribution.  In developing  countries, governments  are involved more with  fos-
tering  economic  development  through  participation  in  industrial  projects  and  the
provision  of infrastructure  and  basic public  services.  The systems  of transfers  and
social  insurance  are  less  elaborate  or  even non-existent.  Tax  systems  differ con-
siderably  as well.  Developing  countries  tend  to  rely much  more on indirect  taxes,
including  excises and  trade  taxes,  than  do industrialized  countries.  This  hampers
their  ability to use the tax  system for redistribution.  The administrative  machinery
for collecting taxes  also tends  to be less efficient.  Finally, developing  countries  tend
to  have fiscal systems  that  are much more centralized  than  in developing countries.
Even  where  expenditure  responsibilities  are  decentralized,  taxation  tends  not  to
be.  Much  of the  funding  for state  and  local  services often  comes from  the  federal
government,  frequently  in  a  way which  impedes  lower level  autonomy  and  fiscal
responsibility.
One might  expect  that,  as these economies develop, their  fiscal systems  would
converge  more  to  those  of the  industrialized  countries.  Indeed,  there  are  those
who would argue that  the convergence itself would enhance  development  by making
public  sectors  more effective.  In particular,  the  decentralization  of the provision  of
fiscal services to lower levels of government  would make governments  more efficient
and  more  responsive  to  the  actual  needs  of the  citizens  and  the  economy.  To be
effective, this  decentralization  would have to  be accompanied  by enough  decentral-
ization  of revenue raising responsibilities  to make lower levels of government  fiscally
autonomous  and accountable.  It  would also need to be accompanied  by a system  of
fiscal arrangements  which includes both  a set of fiscal transfers  designed to maintain
the  efficiency and  equity  of the  internal  economic union  and  appropriate  measures
23to  coordinate  the tax  systems  among various jurisdictions. 8
The process  of tax reform is high on the agenda  of many  developing  countries.
The  existence  of multiple  levels of government  with  their  own revenue  raising  re-
sponsibilities  will affect  the  directions  of tax  reform  that  are  desirable  as  well as
feasible.  In this  concluding  section,  we summarize  some of the  main ways in which
that  is so without  reference to the  case of any particular  country.  There  will natu-
rally  be  institutional  or  constitutional  constraints  which limit  the extent  to  which
systems  that  are ideal from an economic point of view can actually  be implemented.
i.  Tax Assignmeni
To the  extent  that  the assignment  of taxes  to different  levels of government  can be
chosen,  it  should  be  done  according  to  the  principles  outlined  earlier.  Efficiency,
equity  and  administrative  simplicity are all factors.  Efficiency considerations  would
suggest  centralizing  taxes  applied  on  more  mobile  bases.  Equity  considerations
would suggest centralizing  taxes which serve a redistributive  purpose.  Decentralized
tax  administration  is  simpler  the  less important  are  cross-border  transactions  for
the  tax base.
Direct  taxes  are good candidates  for federal  assignment,  especially corporation
taxes,  capital  taxes,  personal  income taxes,  and taxes  on wealth  and  wealth  trans-
fers.  Taxes  on  trade  should  also be  federal.  The  states  could  use indirect  taxes,
both  excises (including  energy taxes) and general  sales taxes.  Payroll taxes could be
used by the  states.  Property  taxes  are ideally suited for local revenues,  though  the
state  government  may  well have a  role in  assessment  and  in equalizing  municipal
revenues.  User charges are also a good source of state  and  local revenue.
Resource  taxes  are  an  interesting  case.  Efficiency considerations  would  make
them  suitable  for state  use since they  are immobile.  As well, from  a resource man-
agement  point  of view, state  control  might  be beneficial.  However, in  many  coun-
tries,  major  resource  tax  bases,  such as oil and  gas,  are very unevenly  distributed
so fiscal inefficiencies and  inequities  can  arise from  their  assignment  to  state  gov-
ernments.  In these  circumstances,  federal  assignment  would be  desired.  Those  like
forestry  and  minerals  could remain  with  the  states.  If some  or  all resource  taxes
are assigned  to the  states,  it is important  that  the federal government  implement  a
system  of overarching  equalizing  transfers  as discussed  below which  includes  state
resource  taxes.
ii.  Tax Design
The  design  of particular  taxes  will depend  upon  the  level at  which  they  are  con-
trolled.  This  is most  apparent  in the case of sales taxes.  At the federal  level, there
are good  reasons  for  using a VAT for general  sales  taxation.  A VAT ensures  that
traded  goods  are  treated  properly  and  that  final sales  are  purged  of all taxes  on
business  inputs.  The  tax  can be  levied on  a destination  base  with  little  difficulty.
Compliance  problems  should be reduced  and collection  costs minimized  for the tax
8  A summary of the case for decentralizing fiscal systems in developing countries may
be found in Boadway, Roberts and Shah (1994).
24authority  (although  compliance  costs  for  the  private  sector  will  be  higher).  How-
ever,  for  general  sales  taxes  levied  by  the  states,  a  VAT  is  much  more  difficult  to
administer.  There  are  several  reasons  for  this.  First,  the  system  of crediting  taxes
on  inputs  becomes  complicated  on  cross-border  transactions.  Taxes  levied  on  a
transaction  in  one  state,  in  which  an  intermediate  input  is  sold  to  a  producer  in
another  state,  are  credited  to  the  tax  authority  in  the  latter;  the  credit  should  be
transferred  to  the  'exporting'  state.  If tax  systems  differ  among  states,  this  is com-
plicated  to  administer,  especially  given  the  absence  of border  controls.  The  second
problem  also  arises  from  the  absence  of border  controls.  Cross-border  shopping  by
final  demanders  becomes  difficult  to  preclude  so  that  it  is  difficult  to  operate  the
tax  on  a full  destination  basis.  From  a practical  point  of view,  taxes  on  cross-border
purchases  will  accrue  to  the  state  of origin  rather  than  that  of destination.  On  the
administrative  side,  the  cost  of  operating  several  state-level  VATs  would  be  quite
high.  As  well,  auditing  priorities  within  a  given  state  could  be  skewed  in  favor  of
those  things  which  are  likely  to  generate  revenue  for  a  state's  own  treasury.
The  design  of destination-based  excise  taxes  by  state  governments  will  also  be
constrained  by  cross-border  transactions.  These  will essentially  limit  the  extent  to
which  neighboring  states  can  choose  differential  tax  rates.  Cross-border  purchases
will typically  be  taxed  at  origin  rather  than  destination.  Specific  excise  taxes  could,
of  course,  be  levied  on  an  origin  basis.  While  this  would  avoid  the  cross-border
shopping  problem,  it  could  induce  inefficiency  in  the  internal  common  market.  Any
tax  differentials  would  give  an  incentive  for  producers  to  locate  in  the  lower-tax
jurisdictions.  States  would  be  more  inclined  to  engage  in  beggar-thy-neighbor  tax
competition.
The  choice  of income  tax  structures  could  also be  influenced  by decentralization
to  the  states.  Again,  tax  competition  would  affect  the  degree  of  progressivity  of
the  personal  income  tax  system  and  the  structure  of  incentives  for  the  corporate
tax  system.  Tax  administration  would  also  be  more  complicated,  especially  as
regards  the  treatment  of income  earned  outside  the  jurisdiction.  In  the  absence  of
tax  treaties  and  administrative  cooperation,  it  would  be  very  difficult  practically
to  ensure  compliance.  Moreover,  with  independent  decision  making,  it  would  be
difficult  to  ensure  that  income  earned  outside  a  given  jurisdiction  was  taxed  once
and  only  once  within  the  federation.
The  design  of some  other  forms  of taxation  are  much  less  constrained  by  decen-
tralization.  Payroll  taxation  avoids  most  of the  above  problems  since  cross-border
transactions  are  a  relatively  small  part  of payrolls;  most  workers  reside  where  they
work.  Similarly,  resource  taxes,  property  taxes  and  user  charges  are  relatively  un-
affected  by  decentralization.  The  only  effect  of decentralization  is to  induce  some
fiscal  accountability  through  tax  competition,  and  that  may  be  beneficial  rather
than  disadvantageous  on  balance.
iii.  The  Tax Mix
All  countries  obtain  their  tax  revenues  from  a  variety  of sources,  even  though  the
ultimate  bases  of some  taxes  are  quite  similar.  In the  absence  of federalism  consid-
erations,  the  balance  among  tax  sources  depends  upon  a  variety  of factors.  Relying
25on  a mix  of taxes  ensures  that  rates  for each  component  tax  are  lower than  they
otherwise  would  be.  That  makes  tax  administration  less  costly  by reducing  the
incentive  to evade and avoid taxes.  It also broadens  the net of taxpayers  since those
who can  avoid one  type  of tax  may  end  up paying  another.  The  cost  of having  a
mix of taxes is that  one duplicates  administrative  costs.  As well, some of the other
goals  of government,  such  as equity,  may be  compromised  by not  being  able fully
to  pursue  redistributive  policies  through  a given type of tax.
The decentralization  of some tax  bases may further  constrain  the public  sector
in its  choice of tax  mix and  its  ability  to  achieve its  overall goals.  For example,  if
significant  tax  responsibility  is decentralized  to the states,  the  ability of the federal
government  to choose the optimal mix from the point of view of the entire  federation
may  be  compromised,  especially  if the  decentralization  is concentrated  on one tax
type.
iv.  Tax Harmonization  and  Coordination
Tax harmonization  and  coordination  are important  objectives  of tax  policy.  They
contribute  to  the efficiency of the  internal  common  market,  reduce  collection  and
compliance  costs  and  help  to  achieve  national  standards  of  equity.  Tax  harmo-
nization  may be horizontal  (among  states)  as well as vertical  (between  the  federal
government  and  the states).  In the case of tax bases jointly  occupied  by the  federal
government  and the  states,  harmonization  can be achieved without  sacrificing state
fiscal  responsibility  by  having  a  single  centralized  collection  procedure  combined
with  the  ability of the states  to  decide on their own tax  rates.  Such vertical  harmo-
nization  can be of varying  degrees.  The states  may simply be required  to  abide  by
the  federal  base,  but  be allowed to impose  their  own rate  structures.  Or they  may
be  required  to  abide  by  the  federal  rate  structure  and  only  be  allowed to  choose
their  own rate  levels and  possible  schedules of credits.  Fiscal responsibility  would
require  that  they  at least  be able to  set their  own rate  levels.  A formula  must  exist
for allocating  tax bases  among states  for those  who are taxpayers  in more than  one
state.
It is rather  more difficult to harmonize  indirect  taxes  than  to harmonize  direct
taxes.  On the  other  hand,  harmonization  of indirect  taxes  is not nearly  as pressing
a need  since the  efficiency costs  of decentralized  indirect  tax  systems  is not  likely
to  be  high  and  equity  objectives  are not  likely to  be threatened.  Since state  sales
taxes  should be single-staged,  it will not  be possible  to operate  a joint  federal-state
VAT system.  The  best  that  can be done  is to  adopt  a common  base  for the  state
sales tax  as for the  federal  VAT and  jointly  administer  them.  If the  states  alone
operate  general  sales taxes,  their  bases  could be harmonized  by agreement.
Tax sharing  schemes in which  the  revenues from  a federally-administered  tax
source  are  shared  in a given way with  the  states  of origin may  be used  to  address
fiscal gaps at the state  level.  These have the advantage  that  the tax  system  remains
highly  harmonized.  However, they  have the  significant  disadvantage  that  no fiscal
responsibility  is assumed  by the states.  It is generally preferable  for the states  to be
allowed to  set  their  own rates  within  an  otherwise  harmonized  system.  If revenue
sharing  is used,  it is preferable  that  it not  be done  on a tax-by-tax  basis.
26Table 1:  Conceptual  Basis of Tax Assignment
Determination  of  Collection  &
Tax Type  Base  Rate  Admin.  Comments
Customs  F  F  F  Int'l  trade  taxes
Corporate  income  F  F  F  Mobile factor
Resource  taxes
Rent (profit)  tax  F  F  F  unequally  distributed
Royalties/fees;
severance taxes;
production  taxes  S,L  S,L  S,L  benefit taxes
Conservation  chgs  S,L  S,L  S,L  environment  preserv.
Personal income  F  F,S,L  F  Redistrib.,  mobility,
stabilization
Wealth taxes (capital,
wealth transfers,  F  F,S  F  Redistributive
inheritances)
Payroll  F,S  F,S  F,S  social programs
Value-added  tax  F  F  F  admin. costs, stabiliz.
Single-stage  sales
Option A  S  S,L  S,L  Higher compliance  costs
Option B  F  S  F  Harmonized
"Sin"  taxes
alcohol, tobacco  F,S  F,S  F,S  Health care shared  resp.
gambling,betting S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local  resp.
lotteries  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local  resp.
race tracks  S,L  S,L  S,L  State and local  resp.
Taxation  of "Bads"
Carbon  F  F  F  global/national  pollut.
BTU taxes  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  by extent  of pollution
Motor fuels  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  tolls on road use
Effluent  charges  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  by extent  of pollution
Congestion  tolls  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  tolls  on road use
Parking fees  L  L  L  local  congestion
Motor  vehicles
Registration,  S  S  S  state revenue source
Driver's licenses  S  S  S  state revenue source
Business  taxes  S  S  S  benefit tax
Excises  S  S  S  immobile  base
Property  S  L  L  benefit tax, immobile
Land  S  L  L  benefit tax, immobile
Frontage/betterment  S,L  L  L  cost recovery
Poll tax  S,L  S,L  S,L  non-distorting
User charges  F,S,L  F,S,L  F,S,L  payment for services
27Table  2. Tax  Assignment  in  Selected  Developing
Countries
Number  of  Countries  with  Subnational  Determination  of:
Type of  Tax  Base  Rate  Tax  Collection  &
Administration
Customs  1  1  2
Income  & Gifts  1  1  6
Estates  4  4  4
Corporate  1  1  4
Resource  3  3  6
Sales  4  5  7
VAT  1  1  4
Excises  8  8  12
Property  11  12  14
Fees  10  10  12
Residual  Powers  2  2  2
Note:  Sample  Countries  (15):  Argentina,  Bangladesh,  Brazil,  China,  Colombia,
India,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Papua  New Guinea,
Philippines,  Russian  Federation,  Thailand.
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